A role model for the Bosnian Serbs

A role model for the Bosnian Serbs The fierce opposition of Milosevic's successor, Vojislav Kostunica, to Montenegrin Independence combined with the personal intervention of Javier Solana (and through him the European Union) led to intense pressure on Djukanovic to accept a cobbled together Union of Serbia and Montenegro. He went from being the darling of the West to "persona non grata" almost overnight. When Djukanovic announced his intention to hold a referendum on Independence. The International Community did not welcome it. It preferred the status quo, particularly since Solana had played the instrumental role in forming the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The EU appointed a Special Representative (Former Slovak Ambassador Miroslav Lajcak) to oversee the proposed Referendum. Djukanovic played it perfectly. He cooperated fully with Lajcak and even accepted the arbitrary requirement of having to achieve a 55 percent majority for his Referendum on Independence to be successful. It barely passed, but the open and cooperative approach of his government throughout the process (plus growing doubts about the political situation in Serbia) led to a total reversal of the view of Djukanovic and Montenegro. Independence was accepted and Montenegro became once again a favored country for the EU, NATO and the US. Tourism has boomed; the economy has grown by high rates each year; and foreign investment last year alone was around $1 billion. The fact is that Milo Djukanovic and his supporters were determined for at least ten years to achieve independence. They were stymied first by the strength of Milosevic and then by the strong opposition of the European Union. But each time, Djukanovic adopted his tactics and approach, keeping the independence option alive while "cooperating" with strong forces opposing it. He ensured that the Union of Serbia and Montenegro would fail not because of active confrontation, but by passive resistance to it in literally hundreds of small ways. When the timing was right and resistance weakest, he moved on his Independence Referendum and the rest is history. International officials dealing with Bosnia should think very carefully about the Montenegrin experience. It precisely outlines the Bosnian Serb strategy for the Republika Srpska (RS). Those who believe that moves by the European Union such as the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA); movement of visas; related financial benefits; or even threats will change that goal are sadly mistaken. These measures may prolong the process and at times even give the appearance of "progress," but the fundamental goal of the Republika Srpska and its Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, will remain the same: independence. Failing to understand this basic point will almost certainly at the end of the day, help to bring it about. The Bosnian Serbs have even stronger resistance to overcome than Djukanovic in Montenegro. From the very beginning of the conflict in Bosnia, the Western Community established as a fundamental principle that there would be no change in Bosnia's borders. That remains as true today as fifteen years ago and is a mantra regularly repeated at senior levels. Internally, the Bosniaks are fiercely opposed to any such step and many would at least threaten to use violence to prevent it. The Dayton Agreement has no provision of any kind for any entity or ethnic group breaking away from Bosnia. On the other hand, it is common knowledge that the overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs see themselves living not in Bosnia, but in the Republika Srpska. Ironically, the Dayton Agreement itself provides the "weapons" to passively resist the establishment of a strong Bosnian state. On the one hand, it clearly gives the RS definite powers and authorities and the ability to frustrate the plans of the other ethnic groups. On the other, it is a totally unworkable document whose dysfunctional nature reinforces the failure of the Bosnian state. Dodik also has the passive encouragement of many Bosnian Croats, who feel far more loyalty to Croatia than they do to Bosnia. Many would see a successful departure of Republika Srpska as opening the door to their own "escape." The Stabilization and Association Agreement signed with Bosnia by the EU on June 16 is the major tool it wishes to use to persuade all the parties in Bosnia to undertake needed reforms of the Constitution and to begin to work in unity towards common goals, strengthening the central government along the way. The EU's problem, however, is that the length of time and amount of work on the part of Bosnia to reach the point of membership is far too long and far too complicated to be a meaningful incentive. The Bosnian Serbs will take the benefits from signing the SAA and will drag their feet on fulfilling its obligations. The "Soft Power" of the EU only works when the people of the involved country value EU membership more than anything else and willingly adapt to the EU regulations and procedures. This is not the case with the Bosnian Serbs. Most would choose Independence over the EU. Particularly after Kosovo's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Milorad Dodik has frequently referred to a possible Referendum on Independence in the RS. This serves two purposes. First, it plants the seed for action in the future. Secondly, it discourages the Office of the High Representative and the PIC Steering Board from taking any strong actions against him or the Republika Srpska. He has the full measure of the International Community now and fully realizes that it is far weaker than in the past. Given the situation in Kosovo, the last thing that the International Community wants is another crisis in the region. Moreover, it has no appetite for confrontation in Bosnia. The High Representative is encouraged by the PIC Steering Board to be active, but it is clear even to outside observers that he would not receive strong backing for any "initiatives" he took which backfired. The balance of power has definitely shifted. It used to be that Bosnians could not afford a confrontation with the International Community. Now it is the other way around. Unless provoked by a strong effort to take away the powers of the Republika Srpska, Dodik will bide his time. He wants the OHR to go away and be replaced by a EU Mission without Bonn Powers and therefore far less powerful and influential. He also knows that the end of the OHR and its replacement by the EU Mission will eliminate or significantly reduce US influence. This is an absolutely key factor, as more than any other country, it has been the United States, which has insisted on maintaining Bosnia within its current borders. The EU, not understanding the strategic goal of the Bosnian Serbs and overly confident in its "soft power" is playing into their hands. Another important factor for Dodik is that he will want "reasonable" people in Europe and elsewhere to sympathize to some extent to the idea of a Referendum. It was possible in Montenegro only when the political situation in Serbia deteriorated. It will be helped in Bosnia by the continued stalemate and lack of successful action at the national level; counter-productive rhetoric from the Bosniak side; and most importantly, if the RS could show a positive contrast between its economic success and cohesion with that of the Federation. RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik (FoNet) In the latter half of the 1990s, Milo Djukanovic became a favorite of the Western International Community. It saw him as a wedge to use against Milosevic and ultimately help to bring down his government. This all changed on Oct. 5, 2000 with the downfall of Milosevic. The West turned most of its attention and support to the new government in Serbia. William Montgomery "Particularly after Kosovo's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Milorad Dodik has frequently referred to a possible Referendum on Independence in the RS. This serves two purposes. First, it plants the seed for action in the future."

A role model for the Bosnian Serbs

The fierce opposition of Milošević's successor, Vojislav Koštunica, to Montenegrin Independence combined with the personal intervention of Javier Solana (and through him the European Union) led to intense pressure on Đukanović to accept a cobbled together Union of Serbia and Montenegro. He went from being the darling of the West to "persona non grata" almost overnight.

When Đukanović announced his intention to hold a referendum on Independence. The International Community did not welcome it. It preferred the status quo, particularly since Solana had played the instrumental role in forming the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The EU appointed a Special Representative (Former Slovak Ambassador Miroslav Lajčak) to oversee the proposed Referendum. Đukanović played it perfectly. He cooperated fully with Lajčak and even accepted the arbitrary requirement of having to achieve a 55 percent majority for his Referendum on Independence to be successful.

It barely passed, but the open and cooperative approach of his government throughout the process (plus growing doubts about the political situation in Serbia) led to a total reversal of the view of Đukanović and Montenegro. Independence was accepted and Montenegro became once again a favored country for the EU, NATO and the US. Tourism has boomed; the economy has grown by high rates each year; and foreign investment last year alone was around $1 billion.

The fact is that Milo Đukanović and his supporters were determined for at least ten years to achieve independence. They were stymied first by the strength of Milošević and then by the strong opposition of the European Union. But each time, Đukanović adopted his tactics and approach, keeping the independence option alive while "cooperating" with strong forces opposing it.

He ensured that the Union of Serbia and Montenegro would fail not because of active confrontation, but by passive resistance to it in literally hundreds of small ways. When the timing was right and resistance weakest, he moved on his Independence Referendum and the rest is history.

International officials dealing with Bosnia should think very carefully about the Montenegrin experience. It precisely outlines the Bosnian Serb strategy for the Republika Srpska (RS). Those who believe that moves by the European Union such as the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA); movement of visas; related financial benefits; or even threats will change that goal are sadly mistaken.

These measures may prolong the process and at times even give the appearance of "progress," but the fundamental goal of the Republika Srpska and its Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, will remain the same: independence. Failing to understand this basic point will almost certainly at the end of the day, help to bring it about.

The Bosnian Serbs have even stronger resistance to overcome than Đukanović in Montenegro. From the very beginning of the conflict in Bosnia, the Western Community established as a fundamental principle that there would be no change in Bosnia's borders. That remains as true today as fifteen years ago and is a mantra regularly repeated at senior levels. Internally, the Bosniaks are fiercely opposed to any such step and many would at least threaten to use violence to prevent it. The Dayton Agreement has no provision of any kind for any entity or ethnic group breaking away from Bosnia.

On the other hand, it is common knowledge that the overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs see themselves living not in Bosnia, but in the Republika Srpska. Ironically, the Dayton Agreement itself provides the "weapons" to passively resist the establishment of a strong Bosnian state. On the one hand, it clearly gives the RS definite powers and authorities and the ability to frustrate the plans of the other ethnic groups.

On the other, it is a totally unworkable document whose dysfunctional nature reinforces the failure of the Bosnian state. Dodik also has the passive encouragement of many Bosnian Croats, who feel far more loyalty to Croatia than they do to Bosnia. Many would see a successful departure of Republika Srpska as opening the door to their own "escape."

The Stabilization and Association Agreement signed with Bosnia by the EU on June 16 is the major tool it wishes to use to persuade all the parties in Bosnia to undertake needed reforms of the Constitution and to begin to work in unity towards common goals, strengthening the central government along the way. The EU's problem, however, is that the length of time and amount of work on the part of Bosnia to reach the point of membership is far too long and far too complicated to be a meaningful incentive.

The Bosnian Serbs will take the benefits from signing the SAA and will drag their feet on fulfilling its obligations. The "Soft Power" of the EU only works when the people of the involved country value EU membership more than anything else and willingly adapt to the EU regulations and procedures. This is not the case with the Bosnian Serbs. Most would choose Independence over the EU.

Particularly after Kosovo's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Milorad Dodik has frequently referred to a possible Referendum on Independence in the RS. This serves two purposes. First, it plants the seed for action in the future. Secondly, it discourages the Office of the High Representative and the PIC Steering Board from taking any strong actions against him or the Republika Srpska. He has the full measure of the International Community now and fully realizes that it is far weaker than in the past.

Given the situation in Kosovo, the last thing that the International Community wants is another crisis in the region. Moreover, it has no appetite for confrontation in Bosnia. The High Representative is encouraged by the PIC Steering Board to be active, but it is clear even to outside observers that he would not receive strong backing for any "initiatives" he took which backfired. The balance of power has definitely shifted. It used to be that Bosnians could not afford a confrontation with the International Community. Now it is the other way around.

Unless provoked by a strong effort to take away the powers of the Republika Srpska, Dodik will bide his time. He wants the OHR to go away and be replaced by a EU Mission without Bonn Powers and therefore far less powerful and influential. He also knows that the end of the OHR and its replacement by the EU Mission will eliminate or significantly reduce US influence.

This is an absolutely key factor, as more than any other country, it has been the United States, which has insisted on maintaining Bosnia within its current borders. The EU, not understanding the strategic goal of the Bosnian Serbs and overly confident in its "soft power" is playing into their hands.

Another important factor for Dodik is that he will want "reasonable" people in Europe and elsewhere to sympathize to some extent to the idea of a Referendum. It was possible in Montenegro only when the political situation in Serbia deteriorated. It will be helped in Bosnia by the continued stalemate and lack of successful action at the national level; counter-productive rhetoric from the Bosniak side; and most importantly, if the RS could show a positive contrast between its economic success and cohesion with that of the Federation.