Russia asserts itself

Russia asserts itself They have reinforced their positions not only in the breakaway enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also in the strategic crossroads town of Gori, only 64 kilometers from Georgia's capital of Tbilisi. In "Realpolitik" terms, Russia has: -Shown the world that the United States, the EU and NATO are "paper tigers" in this part of the world. None of them has been able to have any significant impact whatsoever on events on the ground. Russia has therefore more clearly defined what it considers its sphere of influence and dared anyone to challenge it. -"Punished" Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili for his efforts to re-assert control over the breakaway enclaves of his country and also for cozying up to the United States and NATO. It has been a crushing defeat for the Georgian military and Georgian policy altogether. -Reminded all of the countries of the Russian near abroad that it is once again a major world power to be crossed at one's peril. -Ensured that the breakaway enclaves will stay free of Georgian control for the foreseeable future. -Increased the perceived risk to NATO countries of deeper involvement in this area. -Demonstrated that ignoring Russian objections to Kosovo independence has definite consequences. This is a key moment in international affairs, as it marks a new phase of Russian history and brings to an end the period of post Cold War transition and uncertainties following the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. That period initially was filled with hope for a genuine democratic transition in Russia and cooperation with the West, but increasingly from Russian eyes it meant economic chaos and a confusing fall from the pride of being a world superpower to a humbled, almost forgotten player on the world stage. Empowered by the skyrocketing price for its oil and gas exports and led by a man whose worldview was formed by the Cold War, Russia has transformed itself into an authoritarian power determined to re-establish its hegemony over its "near abroad" in a manner more fitting to the 19th century than the 21st. Its primary weapon of choice is its massive oil and gas reserves, but it has shown now the willingness, when provoked, to use its military force both within its borders (Chechnya) and outside them. It has no real ideology, but it does have a major aversion to Western democratic practices and an affinity with authoritarian regimes that consistently places it as odds with the West. No one should have been surprised at the Russian reaction in Georgia. Putin has many faults, but he has consistently spelled out bluntly and clearly what to expect from Russia. What is surprising, therefore, is only that once again the United States in particular seems to have been "surprised" at the Russian action. Just as it was in the case of Russian support for the Serbian position against independence for Kosovo, even though Russia telegraphed its position consistently and clearly for months. Part of the explanation is that at least some in the West wanted to avoid creating a "self-fulfilling prophecy" whereby treating Russia more as an adversary would help to ensure that was the case. This led to a determined effort to accent the positive in our relationship and overlook Russia's reversal of democratic practices and obstructionism in dealing with other authoritarian regimes around the world. At the same time, however, it also seems clear that there was a remarkable lack of appreciation particularly in the United States for the implications of Russia's drift towards authoritarianism and aggressiveness. We failed to comprehend that our policy of engagement and support for democratic change toward the Russian "near abroad" was becoming increasingly dangerous. The Western support for the "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine, which brought to power pro-Western, anti-Russian governments in those countries was seen, rightly or wrongly, by Putin as a major provocation. We seemingly did not understand that we were provoking a bear and not a lamb. The Russian angst was increased even more as the United States sent trainers and equipment to build up the Georgian Army and strongly supported - with rhetoric - its sovereignty over all of its territory, including the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. President Bush fought hard at the NATO Summit to get invitations to both Ukraine and Georgia to begin the process leading to membership. Although this was blocked, the Summit did officially state that it was envisioned at some point that both would be members. Georgia's President had as his policy priority the recovery of all the lost territories and over the past year, actually succeeded in taking back two much smaller breakaway parts. His decision to move into South Ossetia after an increasing series of low-level military incidents was the catalyst for the robust Russian response. Russia has thrown down a serious challenge to NATO, the United States, and the EU. One which none of the above are eager (or perhaps even able) to handle. The most significant initial response was the signing of the long-delayed agreement between Poland and the United States to locate a U.S. missile defense base in Poland. To close the deal quickly, two components were added which will upset Russia as much or more than its actions in Georgia have upset the West. An American Patriot air defense system that can shoot down shorter-range missiles or attacking fighters or bombers will be moved to Poland and operated by about 100 U.S. soldiers. Furthermore, the United States has agreed to defend Poland at greater speed than required by NATO in case of an attack. NATO needs to consider very carefully the implications of its over-extension in light on Russia's new aggressiveness. It was one thing to take in new members on Russia's borders when facing a weakened state. It is quite another now. What, for example, would NATO do if Russian military forces moved into one of the Baltic States in response to civil unrest involving Russians there? Thirty years ago, it was certain that any attack on one of the NATO members would be viewed as an attack on all and that there would be a robust, immediate response. Can we say the same policy is really in effect now? The Polish insistence of a unilateral U.S. commitment to come to its assistance immediately in case of an attack reflects precisely this concern. NATO also needs to think hard about its policy of strong engagement of potential new members such as Georgia and Ukraine. How do we support the democratic processes in those countries in the face of Russian assertiveness over what it arbitrarily considers its sphere of interest? It would be just as wrong to back away altogether as it is to totally disregard the Russian factor. NATO and the EU also need to come up with a list of measures which its members are willing to take to send a strong message to Russia about the consequences of the Georgian action and anything similar. President Bush has sent a small military contingent to coordinate delivery of humanitarian supplies and Secretary of State Rice has visited Tbilisi. Planned military exercises with Russia this weekend were cancelled. Slightly behind the curve, the Administration has now sharpened its rhetoric as well. Banking on the hope that Russia does want to be an international player, there have been options raised such as blocking its membership in the World Trade Organization; reverting to the original G-7 Summit of industrialized countries and excluding Russia (which was added years ago as a sop to President Yeltsin, making a G-8); suspending negotiations for a trade and security agreement between Russia and the EU; ending the NATO-Russia Council established to give Russia a formal dialogue with NATO; and even threatening a boycott of the 2014 Olympic Games at Sochi (which is only 25 miles from Abkhazia). That these measures are even on the table demonstrates just how much the relationship with Russia has deteriorated. The problem is that getting even one of them actually implemented will be an uphill struggle. No one wants or needs this confrontation, but it appears more and more certain that it is coming. Russian soldiers on Georgian soil: Serious challenge (Beta) In the most significant military excursion outside its borders since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Russian tanks, artillery, infantry units, jet fighters, and naval vessels engaged Georgian military units inside the borders of that country. William Montgomery "Russia has thrown down a serious challenge to NATO, the United States, and the EU. One which none of the above are eager (or perhaps even able) to handle."

Russia asserts itself

They have reinforced their positions not only in the breakaway enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also in the strategic crossroads town of Gori, only 64 kilometers from Georgia's capital of Tbilisi.

In "Realpolitik" terms, Russia has:

-Shown the world that the United States, the EU and NATO are "paper tigers" in this part of the world. None of them has been able to have any significant impact whatsoever on events on the ground. Russia has therefore more clearly defined what it considers its sphere of influence and dared anyone to challenge it.

-"Punished" Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili for his efforts to re-assert control over the breakaway enclaves of his country and also for cozying up to the United States and NATO. It has been a crushing defeat for the Georgian military and Georgian policy altogether.

-Reminded all of the countries of the Russian near abroad that it is once again a major world power to be crossed at one's peril.

-Ensured that the breakaway enclaves will stay free of Georgian control for the foreseeable future.

-Increased the perceived risk to NATO countries of deeper involvement in this area.

-Demonstrated that ignoring Russian objections to Kosovo independence has definite consequences.

This is a key moment in international affairs, as it marks a new phase of Russian history and brings to an end the period of post Cold War transition and uncertainties following the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. That period initially was filled with hope for a genuine democratic transition in Russia and cooperation with the West, but increasingly from Russian eyes it meant economic chaos and a confusing fall from the pride of being a world superpower to a humbled, almost forgotten player on the world stage.

Empowered by the skyrocketing price for its oil and gas exports and led by a man whose worldview was formed by the Cold War, Russia has transformed itself into an authoritarian power determined to re-establish its hegemony over its "near abroad" in a manner more fitting to the 19th century than the 21st.

Its primary weapon of choice is its massive oil and gas reserves, but it has shown now the willingness, when provoked, to use its military force both within its borders (Chechnya) and outside them. It has no real ideology, but it does have a major aversion to Western democratic practices and an affinity with authoritarian regimes that consistently places it as odds with the West.

No one should have been surprised at the Russian reaction in Georgia. Putin has many faults, but he has consistently spelled out bluntly and clearly what to expect from Russia. What is surprising, therefore, is only that once again the United States in particular seems to have been "surprised" at the Russian action. Just as it was in the case of Russian support for the Serbian position against independence for Kosovo, even though Russia telegraphed its position consistently and clearly for months.

Part of the explanation is that at least some in the West wanted to avoid creating a "self-fulfilling prophecy" whereby treating Russia more as an adversary would help to ensure that was the case. This led to a determined effort to accent the positive in our relationship and overlook Russia's reversal of democratic practices and obstructionism in dealing with other authoritarian regimes around the world.

At the same time, however, it also seems clear that there was a remarkable lack of appreciation particularly in the United States for the implications of Russia's drift towards authoritarianism and aggressiveness. We failed to comprehend that our policy of engagement and support for democratic change toward the Russian "near abroad" was becoming increasingly dangerous.

The Western support for the "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine, which brought to power pro-Western, anti-Russian governments in those countries was seen, rightly or wrongly, by Putin as a major provocation. We seemingly did not understand that we were provoking a bear and not a lamb.

The Russian angst was increased even more as the United States sent trainers and equipment to build up the Georgian Army and strongly supported - with rhetoric - its sovereignty over all of its territory, including the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. President Bush fought hard at the NATO Summit to get invitations to both Ukraine and Georgia to begin the process leading to membership.

Although this was blocked, the Summit did officially state that it was envisioned at some point that both would be members. Georgia's President had as his policy priority the recovery of all the lost territories and over the past year, actually succeeded in taking back two much smaller breakaway parts. His decision to move into South Ossetia after an increasing series of low-level military incidents was the catalyst for the robust Russian response.

Russia has thrown down a serious challenge to NATO, the United States, and the EU. One which none of the above are eager (or perhaps even able) to handle. The most significant initial response was the signing of the long-delayed agreement between Poland and the United States to locate a U.S. missile defense base in Poland. To close the deal quickly, two components were added which will upset Russia as much or more than its actions in Georgia have upset the West.

An American Patriot air defense system that can shoot down shorter-range missiles or attacking fighters or bombers will be moved to Poland and operated by about 100 U.S. soldiers. Furthermore, the United States has agreed to defend Poland at greater speed than required by NATO in case of an attack.

NATO needs to consider very carefully the implications of its over-extension in light on Russia's new aggressiveness. It was one thing to take in new members on Russia's borders when facing a weakened state. It is quite another now. What, for example, would NATO do if Russian military forces moved into one of the Baltic States in response to civil unrest involving Russians there?

Thirty years ago, it was certain that any attack on one of the NATO members would be viewed as an attack on all and that there would be a robust, immediate response. Can we say the same policy is really in effect now? The Polish insistence of a unilateral U.S. commitment to come to its assistance immediately in case of an attack reflects precisely this concern.

NATO also needs to think hard about its policy of strong engagement of potential new members such as Georgia and Ukraine. How do we support the democratic processes in those countries in the face of Russian assertiveness over what it arbitrarily considers its sphere of interest? It would be just as wrong to back away altogether as it is to totally disregard the Russian factor.

NATO and the EU also need to come up with a list of measures which its members are willing to take to send a strong message to Russia about the consequences of the Georgian action and anything similar. President Bush has sent a small military contingent to coordinate delivery of humanitarian supplies and Secretary of State Rice has visited Tbilisi. Planned military exercises with Russia this weekend were cancelled. Slightly behind the curve, the Administration has now sharpened its rhetoric as well.

Banking on the hope that Russia does want to be an international player, there have been options raised such as blocking its membership in the World Trade Organization; reverting to the original G-7 Summit of industrialized countries and excluding Russia (which was added years ago as a sop to President Yeltsin, making a G-8); suspending negotiations for a trade and security agreement between Russia and the EU; ending the NATO-Russia Council established to give Russia a formal dialogue with NATO; and even threatening a boycott of the 2014 Olympic Games at Sochi (which is only 25 miles from Abkhazia).

That these measures are even on the table demonstrates just how much the relationship with Russia has deteriorated. The problem is that getting even one of them actually implemented will be an uphill struggle. No one wants or needs this confrontation, but it appears more and more certain that it is coming.