De-militarize to stabilize

De-militarize to stabilize

This is not simply “localitis,” where one comes to have sympathy with the people with whom you are living and working. It also reflects working with different constituencies. Both of the diplomats in this Middle East example are trying their best to move their particular host countries ahead democratically and in closer sync to the United States. Both also see the counter-productive actions of the “other side” as making it harder for moderates in their host countries to gain voter support.

This same effect was very much present during my four years as Ambassador to Serbia and Montenegro. The approach of virtually every American diplomat in Belgrade was radically different than our counterparts at the U.S. Mission in Pristina. We actually “saw” a far different, far bleaker Kosovo than they did. They were anxious to show that UNMIK was succeeding in its tasks and that the region was making significant progress, at least in part because that was exactly what the Administration wanted to hear.

At the same time, the experiences of the war and relations with Serbia during the Milosević regime continued to color the view of the Kosovo Albanians and the International Community in Priština long after the October 2000 upheaval in Serbia. As a result, at least  from our perspective, persecution of minorities was understated, improvements in the security situation overstated, and the Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia proper were given the lion’s share of blame for the deadlocks which were occurring.

There seemed to be little real concern for the tens of thousands of Kosovo Serb refugees, the return of their property, or the re-establishment of their jobs. In Bosnia, the protection of minorities and the establishment of freedom of movement and the right of return was perhaps the biggest priority. In contrast, it seemed from our perspective in Belgrade that it had no priority whatsoever in Kosovo. Any evidence of “concern” seemed to be all words and little, if any, action.

The classic example of this clash of approaches was with regard to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). We in Embassy Belgrade consistently advocated its abolition and were fiercely (and successfully) opposed by the Mission in Priština and the key figures in the Administration.

We are now approaching the time when the decision on the future status of Kosovo will be announced. There is no question but that it will be a form of conditional independence. What everybody needs to watch carefully, however, is how two other issues are resolved, because they may well be the deciding factors in whether the Serbs of Kosovo follow in the footsteps of the Sarajevo Serbs in 1996 and abandon their homes in the face of upcoming transfer of authority in their areas to the Federation.

The first is the well-discussed question of de-centralization. If the International Community truly wants to prevent de-stabilizing Serbia and to prevent the exodus of Kosovo Serbs, it will insist on a large scale decentralization based on logical municipal and village lines of demarcation  and just as importantly, the transfer of significant authority to local government. As I have long said, all they need are the same powers of any U.S. village or city.

The second  key decision, however, is that the KPC should be totally disbanded and not transformed into any other unit whatsoever. The current Prime Minister of Kosovo and former Commander of the KLA,  has publicly stated time and again his intention to turn the KPC into a regular army.

In fact, with its command structure, uniforms, and basic intent, it already is a military unit. It is composed almost entirely of former members of the KLA. It is absolutely impossible to imagine that the unit will somehow become benign and truly multi-ethnic, no matter how many token Serbs are bribed to join. It will be a destabilizing factor in Kosovo and definitely not a stabilizing one. It’s very existence will be a major impetus for Serbs to leave.

What possible military purpose could it serve in Kosovo that a strong and effective police force could not handle? It is not, by the way, simply a potential threat to the minorities of Kosovo. It is just a big a threat to several of the Kosovo Albanian political parties.

Ironically, whenever I argued this case over the years, I was always told privately the same real reason why it was allowed to exist was that the International Community was from the immediate end of the fighting in 1999 tremendously concerned over the potential for additional violence from the KLA and wanted to have a place to put them where they could be watched and perhaps rendered “civilized.”

Whenever I would point out the specific instances of KPC members being implicated in continued acts of violence, I was told that the bad apples were being weeded out. While I accept that there may be idealists out there who somehow think the KPC can suddenly become multi-ethnic in spirit and practice, the reality is that ethnic divisions remain extremely strong in Kosovo and everybody on the ground knows that is the case.

It therefore should seem obvious that a military formed from the ranks of the KLA is a major destabilizing force. Moreover, Kosovo is an economic basket case that needs all the funding and resources it can get simply to survive. Every euro spent on the KPC is a euro which could be used elsewhere.

A similar situation is taking place in Bosnia. One of the lost opportunities of the Dayton Agreement was that it did not totally de-militarize Bosnia. Instead, it tried to limit the armies of the entities and the weapons they held. The United States even was the primary sponsor of a “Train and Equip” Program designed to bring the forces of the Federation up to the standards and equipment of the Republika Srpska.

Far better to have required all sides to totally disarm. Just imagine that NATO forces have been on the ground for almost eleven years in Bosnia, guaranteeing the peace. There was no chance with them present of any side undertaking any military action. Yet billions of dollars was spent on military forces that could have been used for social and educational purposes. What a waste of resources.

Both Bosnia and Kosovo are works very much in progress. Bosnia needs international assistance and a will of its own to change the Constitution and other mechanisms provided at Dayton which simply are unworkable. Kosovo presents the International Community with the dilemma that there is absolutely no good solution for it. The time for that passed ten years ago, at least. 

A major EU/US/NATO effort to bring about real de-militarization in both these places would be a significant positive step forward to regional stabilization, more effective use of resources, and a sign that the International Community is determined to resolve the question of stability (or lack thereof) in the Balkans.

NATO may have to provide some form of security guarantees to seal the deal, but that is exactly the sort of role that the new NATO should be playing.  Both Kosovo and Bosnia, not to mention the region as a whole, will be better off with strong, effective police forces and no military whatsoever.