Carla Del Ponte's memoir

Carla Del Ponte's memoir With that in mind, the pre-publication version of the memoir of its Chief Prosecutor from 2000-2007, Carla Del Ponte is "must reading." Its official title is "Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity's Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity." The bottom line is that it is going to make a great movie!!! The only question is which Hollywood starlet plays Carla. It is the tale of a heroine who battles against reluctant, obstructionist diplomats, politicians, generals, and governments to single-handedly bring war criminals to justice. And this is just describing her relations with the Western governments providing all the funding and support for ICTY. In her view, no one wanted to do enough to help. She had to twist everybody's arms constantly and was just as constantly let down by unfulfilled promises and secret agendas. And after dealing with all that, we come to the governments of the region itself. What she thinks of them is clearly spelled out in the titles of the various chapters: "Confronting Belgrade," "Confronting Croatia," "Confronting Kosovo," and "Confronting Belgrade and Montenegro." Even her own organization is not spared. There is a Chapter entitled "Confronting the Tribunal Bureaucracy." There is no question that all the political leaders in the region saw the ICTY as an explosive and unwelcome issue when it came to members of their own ethnic group during Carla Del Ponte's tenure as Chief Prosecutor. But it is also true that their leaders for the most part were democratically inclined and wanted to become "normal" European countries. So there was room to maneuver and ways to get their cooperation. Her approach of viewing all of the governments and their leaders simply as adversaries to be "confronted" became a self-fulfilling prophecy with a direct, adverse impact on the results she and the ICTY were able to achieve. What is entirely missing in the memoir is any acknowledgement or understanding that the fragile democratically-oriented governments with which she was dealing were themselves struggling mightily with nationalistic political forces in their own countries and a population which in the main still viewed every one of the indictees from their particular ethnic group as a hero. The irony is that her arrogant, high profile visits to the region consistently inflamed nationalistic forces in the countries involved and made it harder, not easier, for their governments to cooperate with the ICTY. As the U.S. Ambassador in Croatia from 1998-2000 and in Serbia from then until 2004, one of my highest priorities - as directed by my government - was the transfer of indictees to The Hague along with supporting documentation of war crimes. I was not unique in this regard. All American Ambassadors in the region, as well as many EU Ambassadors had the same directive. My criticism of Carla Del Ponte, therefore, comes both from her lack of recognition at how hard so many people and so many governments worked to achieve results, as well as how she made our efforts to do so very much harder. The reality is that not one indictee ended up in The Hague because of Carla del Ponte's actions. Some were directly arrested by US, UK, and French forces. Other arrests and negotiated surrenders were handled by the national governments always under intense pressure from the US and EU and often with our direct cooperation and involvement. This process began long before she came to the ICTY and will continue now after her departure. The best example of her approach is the following sentence from her Chapter on "Confronting Belgrade: 2003 and 2004: "I had no intention to ease the pressure upon Serbia to cooperate with the Tribunal after Djindjic's assassination, for this would have been like rewarding an incorrigible child for bad behavior." She rejects any link between the assassination and cooperation with ICTY, calling it "ludicrous." The reality, however, is that the catalyst for the November, 2001 Red Beret revolt, which had such serious consequences for the democratic government of Zoran Djindjic, was the arrest of two ICTY indictees. And the fact is that the assassin himself gave as his reason "he (Djindjic) wanted to send us all to The Hague." What the memoir also does - by its emphasis on her extensive "Confrontations" is to show the corresponding lack of emphasis on what was her real job: to see that the Prosecution Unit of ICTY functioned effectively. Her neglect in this area was most obvious in the botched Milosevic trial, which she blames on the judges, her subordinates and Milosevic himself. Aware that failure to provide the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with vital documents outlining Serbian government involvement in the Bosnian conflict for the ongoing genocide suit filed by Bosnia against Serbia may well have doomed that case, she explains at great length why that was not her fault. But the fact remains that she was so desperate to get the vital documents to bolster her own case against Milosevic that she condoned an agreement, which denied them to the ICJ. What the book also lacks is any description of the decision-making process on which cases to pursue and who would be targeted for possible indictments. This is because it was so haphazard and politically driven. In 2003, Carla Del Ponte met with the three American Ambassadors in the region and the U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes, Pierre Prosper, and bluntly said that the approach of her office was to assume that all the senior leaders on all sides of the conflict were guilty of war crimes and that the job of her office was to find ways to charge them. This had two major flaws: it turned the usual procedure of starting with a major crime and then looking to determine who committed it on its head and it directly implied a total equivalency of guilt among all the wartime leaders. It is also true that her central goal was to obtain the arrest of Mladic and Karadzic and in order to hopefully convince the Serbian government to do so; decisions were made to pursue some questionable indictments to show "balance." The chapter dealing with her experiences in Kosovo is the most interesting. She outlines the obstructions put in the way of ICTY by UNMIK and other international players, as well as the severe intimidation of witnesses against indicted Kosovo Albanians. It all tracks closely with my own perceptions. She also sheds light on her inclination to consider war crimes charges against NATO and the difficulties she encountered in attempting to pursue it. In sum, the best thing about the book is that one comes away with a good sense of Carla del Ponte's mindset and approach to her job with all the limitations that implies. What is lacking, both in the book as a whole and in the laundry list of recommendations she includes in the Epilogue, is any real feeling of concern or interest in how the work of the ICTY and its processes impacted on the region it was set up to help. While the successes of the ICTY in prosecuting war criminals and detailing evidence of their actions is of critical importance, it is equally disconcerting that so many in the region still view their own ethnic group as the innocent victim and view the ICTY as politically biased and its judgments flawed. Surely, at least to some extent, that is also part of Carla Del Ponte's legacy. Carla Del Ponte (Fonet) When anyone takes a serious look at how this region has evolved politically over the past thirteen years, one of the most significant factors has been the role played by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). William Montgomery "While the successes of the ICTY in prosecuting war criminals and detailing evidence of their actions is of critical importance, it is equally disconcerting that so many in the region still view their own ethnic group as the innocent victim."

Carla Del Ponte's memoir

With that in mind, the pre-publication version of the memoir of its Chief Prosecutor from 2000-2007, Carla Del Ponte is "must reading." Its official title is "Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity's Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity."

The bottom line is that it is going to make a great movie!!! The only question is which Hollywood starlet plays Carla. It is the tale of a heroine who battles against reluctant, obstructionist diplomats, politicians, generals, and governments to single-handedly bring war criminals to justice. And this is just describing her relations with the Western governments providing all the funding and support for ICTY. In her view, no one wanted to do enough to help.

She had to twist everybody's arms constantly and was just as constantly let down by unfulfilled promises and secret agendas. And after dealing with all that, we come to the governments of the region itself. What she thinks of them is clearly spelled out in the titles of the various chapters: "Confronting Belgrade," "Confronting Croatia," "Confronting Kosovo," and "Confronting Belgrade and Montenegro." Even her own organization is not spared. There is a Chapter entitled "Confronting the Tribunal Bureaucracy."

There is no question that all the political leaders in the region saw the ICTY as an explosive and unwelcome issue when it came to members of their own ethnic group during Carla Del Ponte's tenure as Chief Prosecutor. But it is also true that their leaders for the most part were democratically inclined and wanted to become "normal" European countries.

So there was room to maneuver and ways to get their cooperation. Her approach of viewing all of the governments and their leaders simply as adversaries to be "confronted" became a self-fulfilling prophecy with a direct, adverse impact on the results she and the ICTY were able to achieve.

What is entirely missing in the memoir is any acknowledgement or understanding that the fragile democratically-oriented governments with which she was dealing were themselves struggling mightily with nationalistic political forces in their own countries and a population which in the main still viewed every one of the indictees from their particular ethnic group as a hero.

The irony is that her arrogant, high profile visits to the region consistently inflamed nationalistic forces in the countries involved and made it harder, not easier, for their governments to cooperate with the ICTY. As the U.S. Ambassador in Croatia from 1998-2000 and in Serbia from then until 2004, one of my highest priorities - as directed by my government - was the transfer of indictees to The Hague along with supporting documentation of war crimes. I was not unique in this regard.

All American Ambassadors in the region, as well as many EU Ambassadors had the same directive. My criticism of Carla Del Ponte, therefore, comes both from her lack of recognition at how hard so many people and so many governments worked to achieve results, as well as how she made our efforts to do so very much harder. The reality is that not one indictee ended up in The Hague because of Carla del Ponte's actions.

Some were directly arrested by US, UK, and French forces. Other arrests and negotiated surrenders were handled by the national governments always under intense pressure from the US and EU and often with our direct cooperation and involvement. This process began long before she came to the ICTY and will continue now after her departure.

The best example of her approach is the following sentence from her Chapter on "Confronting Belgrade: 2003 and 2004: "I had no intention to ease the pressure upon Serbia to cooperate with the Tribunal after Đinđić's assassination, for this would have been like rewarding an incorrigible child for bad behavior." She rejects any link between the assassination and cooperation with ICTY, calling it "ludicrous."

The reality, however, is that the catalyst for the November, 2001 Red Beret revolt, which had such serious consequences for the democratic government of Zoran Đinđić, was the arrest of two ICTY indictees. And the fact is that the assassin himself gave as his reason "he (Đinđić) wanted to send us all to The Hague."

What the memoir also does - by its emphasis on her extensive "Confrontations" is to show the corresponding lack of emphasis on what was her real job: to see that the Prosecution Unit of ICTY functioned effectively. Her neglect in this area was most obvious in the botched Milošević trial, which she blames on the judges, her subordinates and Milošević himself.

Aware that failure to provide the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with vital documents outlining Serbian government involvement in the Bosnian conflict for the ongoing genocide suit filed by Bosnia against Serbia may well have doomed that case, she explains at great length why that was not her fault. But the fact remains that she was so desperate to get the vital documents to bolster her own case against Milošević that she condoned an agreement, which denied them to the ICJ.

What the book also lacks is any description of the decision-making process on which cases to pursue and who would be targeted for possible indictments. This is because it was so haphazard and politically driven. In 2003, Carla Del Ponte met with the three American Ambassadors in the region and the U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes, Pierre Prosper, and bluntly said that the approach of her office was to assume that all the senior leaders on all sides of the conflict were guilty of war crimes and that the job of her office was to find ways to charge them.

This had two major flaws: it turned the usual procedure of starting with a major crime and then looking to determine who committed it on its head and it directly implied a total equivalency of guilt among all the wartime leaders. It is also true that her central goal was to obtain the arrest of Mladić and Karadžić and in order to hopefully convince the Serbian government to do so; decisions were made to pursue some questionable indictments to show "balance."

The chapter dealing with her experiences in Kosovo is the most interesting. She outlines the obstructions put in the way of ICTY by UNMIK and other international players, as well as the severe intimidation of witnesses against indicted Kosovo Albanians. It all tracks closely with my own perceptions. She also sheds light on her inclination to consider war crimes charges against NATO and the difficulties she encountered in attempting to pursue it.

In sum, the best thing about the book is that one comes away with a good sense of Carla del Ponte's mindset and approach to her job with all the limitations that implies. What is lacking, both in the book as a whole and in the laundry list of recommendations she includes in the Epilogue, is any real feeling of concern or interest in how the work of the ICTY and its processes impacted on the region it was set up to help.

While the successes of the ICTY in prosecuting war criminals and detailing evidence of their actions is of critical importance, it is equally disconcerting that so many in the region still view their own ethnic group as the innocent victim and view the ICTY as politically biased and its judgments flawed. Surely, at least to some extent, that is also part of Carla Del Ponte's legacy.