Division in Serbia

Division in Serbia The second version was done after President Tadic narrowly won re-election. The current version reflects what seems to be the beginning of the inevitable clash within the ruling coalition over policies regarding Kosovo. There were a lot of reasons why more than 2.2 million Serbian citizens voted for Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolic in the Serbian Presidential election and others abstained altogether: -Many are very disappointed with the post-Milosevic period. They see the glaring disparities in income; believe that corruption sanctioned by the government and political parties is greater than ever; and generally feel they are worse off now than before. They are desperate for change. The Radicals have been out of power and therefore, ironically, are seen by some as a last gasp alternative. The feeling is a combination of "how could they be any worse?" and “everybody else has had a chance. Let's see what the Radicals will do.” -Many voters who would logically be supporters of Boris Tadic were “fed up” with the compromises he and his party have made with their coalition partners in order to remain in power. This would particularly be true of supporters of Cedomir Jovanovic’s party, the LDP. But it also includes many in Tadic’s own party, the DS. -Sad to say in 2008, but about 1/3rd of the Serbian electorate still embrace the extremist, nationalistic policies of Vojislav Seselj and his surrogate, Tomislav Nikolic. -As has been the history in Serbian politics, tactical infighting between parties, each trying to reduce the others’ popularity and support, all too often overcomes the strategic implications at election time. We saw this time and again in the 1990s, when the parties in opposition to Milosevic were renowned for their inability to stay united and on-message. -Anger at the United States and European Union for the steps they have already taken and are about to take in Kosovo. Many Serbs may not support the Radical philosophy, but wanted a way to show the West just how angry they are. Thumbing their noses at the West and embracing Russia is a way to do that. In contrast, Boris Tadic won the election because of one word: "isolation." Despite all of the above factors, a slim majority of the voters understood that a Nikolic Presidency almost certainly would have been a major step towards a return to the isolation of the 1990s. They want to join Europe and rejected a path that would prevent that from happening. Bold front-age newspaper headlines on Election Day said it all: “Serbia at the Crossroads” and “Serbia Votes on its Future.” Given the various factors working against him and literally being abandoned by most of his coalition partners, this was a significant (however narrow) victory for Tadic, for his party, and for pro-European forces in Serbia. The massive turnout, around 68 percent, showed the high level of interest in Serbia in this election and knowledge of its importance. Tadic now has a mandate to support vigorously his two-track approach of continuing both to advocate the Serbian position on Kosovo and to at the same time pursue integration with the European Union. One of the key questions is whether he will use this mandate fully and effectively. What is also important is that those in the European Union who lobbied hard for a policy of engagement with Serbia, including offering concrete incentives such as the possibility of eliminating visas for Serbian citizens in the near future were shown to be correct in their approach. The offer of an agreement on Political Cooperation with specific incentives on January 28 may well have been a deciding factor in this election. This sort of support will be even more critical in the months ahead. Tadic and his supporters had almost no time whatsoever to celebrate their victory. Even before the official results were announced, they have been plunged into the confrontation within the ruling coalition over Kosovo policy, which has been looming in Serbia for well over a year now. Despite their concerns over the stability of Serbia proper, the United States and the European Union will not deviate or delay significantly the policy, which they have agreed to follow with regard to Kosovo. Within a short period of time they will give the go ahead to the Kosovo Albanians to implement their Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Over a staggered period of time the United States and most of the countries of the European Union will recognize Kosovo's independence. The European Union will also send a Mission to Kosovo to replace UNMIK in the near future as well, despite Serbian protests that it violates their sovereignty. The hard, cold reality is that for Prime Minister Kostunica, these steps are so outrageous and unforgivable, that the only possible reaction by Serbia must be to virtually break relations with any country or organization that is complicit in bringing this about. Moreover, in Kosovo itself, his view is that Serbia must demonstrate aggressively that this UDI is unacceptable and unenforceable. There is no chance that anything can be done to change his mind on this question, as it is at the very core of his worldview. If there were any doubt about how far Kostunica is willing to take this struggle, it was eliminated when he and his party adopted the position that any decision by the European Union to send a Mission to Kosovo to replace UNMIK without the approval of the UN Security Council automatically meant that Serbia would have to refuse any EU invitation to sign the long-awaited Stabilization and Association Agreement. Tadic's refusal to agree to this policy was both the reason why the DSS and NS did not support him in the Presidential elections and also why the elections in the end came to be seen as such a test about Serbia's future direction. The fact that Boric Tadic won re-election as President based exactly on a platform of a two-track approach (defending Serbia's position on Kosovo but encouraging European integration) has demonstrably had no impact whatsoever on Kostunica. He will willingly bring about the very isolation, which a majority of Serbian voters have just rejected. In doing so, he will have the full support of the Radicals. The catalyst for the current government crisis is the European Union offer of an agreement on Political Cooperation, ready to be signed on February 7. One of the central features would be the eventual elimination of visas for Serbian citizens traveling to the EU. Nevertheless, because the EU has taken now all but the final step of approval by its Council of Ministers to send its Mission to Kosovo, the Prime Minister and his coalition partner, Velimir Ilic, have refused to sanction the signing of any Political Agreement with the EU. It is an interesting gambit. Because the Political Agreement deliberately says nothing whatsoever about Kosovo and gives a potential benefit to Serbian citizens they have long wanted, it would have been possible in theory to not make a big issue over it at this time. Particularly since a majority of Serbs have just demonstrated in an election their clear preference to go ahead with European integration. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister has chosen this moment and this issue to challenge Tadic, the Democratic Party and G17 Plus. He is provoking a crisis in the ruling coalition, which seemingly can only end in its dissolution. There seems to be only two logical paths. One would be new Parliamentary elections, probably in May. This has risks for almost every party, except the Radicals. It is hard to see any scenario in which they would not gain some additional percent over their current representation in Parliament. But the variables of "fear of isolation" and events in Kosovo make it hard to predict the eventual impact on the DSS, the NS, G17Plus and the Democratic Party. The other alternative is a new government led by Kostunica and formed from the current Parliament either with the support of the Radicals or actually including them. This would be preceded by Kostunica calling for a "Government of National Unity" in light of the Kosovo crisis, knowing full well that the Democratic Party, G17 Plus and the LDP would not participate. This all brings to mind the standard television scenes of broadcasters standing out in the wind and rain on a shoreline, looking at the angry sea and waiting for the hurricane which is about to descend on them. While this "hurricane" will be entirely due to human decisions, that doesn't mean that the damage will be any less devastating. Almost no time to celebrate: Tadic supporters (FoNet) I apologize to readers if my column this week seems more disjointed than usual. It reflects the rapidly changing Serbian political scene. The first draft was written when it appeared that the Radical Party candidate for President, Tomislav Nikolic, might well win the Second Round of elections. William Montgomery Tadic now has a mandate to support vigorously his two-track approach of continuing both to advocate the Serbian position on Kosovo and to at the same time pursue integration with the European Union. One of the key questions is whether he will use this mandate fully and effectively.

Division in Serbia

The second version was done after President Tadić narrowly won re-election. The current version reflects what seems to be the beginning of the inevitable clash within the ruling coalition over policies regarding Kosovo.

There were a lot of reasons why more than 2.2 million Serbian citizens voted for Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolić in the Serbian Presidential election and others abstained altogether:

-Many are very disappointed with the post-Milošević period. They see the glaring disparities in income; believe that corruption sanctioned by the government and political parties is greater than ever; and generally feel they are worse off now than before.

They are desperate for change. The Radicals have been out of power and therefore, ironically, are seen by some as a last gasp alternative. The feeling is a combination of "how could they be any worse?" and “everybody else has had a chance. Let's see what the Radicals will do.”

-Many voters who would logically be supporters of Boris Tadić were “fed up” with the compromises he and his party have made with their coalition partners in order to remain in power. This would particularly be true of supporters of Cedomir Jovanovic’s party, the LDP. But it also includes many in Tadić’s own party, the DS.

-Sad to say in 2008, but about 1/3rd of the Serbian electorate still embrace the extremist, nationalistic policies of Vojislav Šešelj and his surrogate, Tomislav Nikolić.

-As has been the history in Serbian politics, tactical infighting between parties, each trying to reduce the others’ popularity and support, all too often overcomes the strategic implications at election time. We saw this time and again in the 1990s, when the parties in opposition to Milošević were renowned for their inability to stay united and on-message.

-Anger at the United States and European Union for the steps they have already taken and are about to take in Kosovo. Many Serbs may not support the Radical philosophy, but wanted a way to show the West just how angry they are. Thumbing their noses at the West and embracing Russia is a way to do that.

In contrast, Boris Tadić won the election because of one word: "isolation." Despite all of the above factors, a slim majority of the voters understood that a Nikolić Presidency almost certainly would have been a major step towards a return to the isolation of the 1990s.

They want to join Europe and rejected a path that would prevent that from happening. Bold front-age newspaper headlines on Election Day said it all: “Serbia at the Crossroads” and “Serbia Votes on its Future.”

Given the various factors working against him and literally being abandoned by most of his coalition partners, this was a significant (however narrow) victory for Tadić, for his party, and for pro-European forces in Serbia. The massive turnout, around 68 percent, showed the high level of interest in Serbia in this election and knowledge of its importance.

Tadić now has a mandate to support vigorously his two-track approach of continuing both to advocate the Serbian position on Kosovo and to at the same time pursue integration with the European Union. One of the key questions is whether he will use this mandate fully and effectively.

What is also important is that those in the European Union who lobbied hard for a policy of engagement with Serbia, including offering concrete incentives such as the possibility of eliminating visas for Serbian citizens in the near future were shown to be correct in their approach. The offer of an agreement on Political Cooperation with specific incentives on January 28 may well have been a deciding factor in this election. This sort of support will be even more critical in the months ahead.

Tadić and his supporters had almost no time whatsoever to celebrate their victory. Even before the official results were announced, they have been plunged into the confrontation within the ruling coalition over Kosovo policy, which has been looming in Serbia for well over a year now. Despite their concerns over the stability of Serbia proper, the United States and the European Union will not deviate or delay significantly the policy, which they have agreed to follow with regard to Kosovo.

Within a short period of time they will give the go ahead to the Kosovo Albanians to implement their Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Over a staggered period of time the United States and most of the countries of the European Union will recognize Kosovo's independence. The European Union will also send a Mission to Kosovo to replace UNMIK in the near future as well, despite Serbian protests that it violates their sovereignty.

The hard, cold reality is that for Prime Minister Koštunica, these steps are so outrageous and unforgivable, that the only possible reaction by Serbia must be to virtually break relations with any country or organization that is complicit in bringing this about. Moreover, in Kosovo itself, his view is that Serbia must demonstrate aggressively that this UDI is unacceptable and unenforceable. There is no chance that anything can be done to change his mind on this question, as it is at the very core of his worldview.

If there were any doubt about how far Koštunica is willing to take this struggle, it was eliminated when he and his party adopted the position that any decision by the European Union to send a Mission to Kosovo to replace UNMIK without the approval of the UN Security Council automatically meant that Serbia would have to refuse any EU invitation to sign the long-awaited Stabilization and Association Agreement.

Tadić's refusal to agree to this policy was both the reason why the DSS and NS did not support him in the Presidential elections and also why the elections in the end came to be seen as such a test about Serbia's future direction.

The fact that Boric Tadić won re-election as President based exactly on a platform of a two-track approach (defending Serbia's position on Kosovo but encouraging European integration) has demonstrably had no impact whatsoever on Koštunica. He will willingly bring about the very isolation, which a majority of Serbian voters have just rejected. In doing so, he will have the full support of the Radicals.

The catalyst for the current government crisis is the European Union offer of an agreement on Political Cooperation, ready to be signed on February 7. One of the central features would be the eventual elimination of visas for Serbian citizens traveling to the EU. Nevertheless, because the EU has taken now all but the final step of approval by its Council of Ministers to send its Mission to Kosovo, the Prime Minister and his coalition partner, Velimir Ilic, have refused to sanction the signing of any Political Agreement with the EU.

It is an interesting gambit. Because the Political Agreement deliberately says nothing whatsoever about Kosovo and gives a potential benefit to Serbian citizens they have long wanted, it would have been possible in theory to not make a big issue over it at this time. Particularly since a majority of Serbs have just demonstrated in an election their clear preference to go ahead with European integration.

Nevertheless, the Prime Minister has chosen this moment and this issue to challenge Tadić, the Democratic Party and G17 Plus. He is provoking a crisis in the ruling coalition, which seemingly can only end in its dissolution.

There seems to be only two logical paths. One would be new Parliamentary elections, probably in May. This has risks for almost every party, except the Radicals. It is hard to see any scenario in which they would not gain some additional percent over their current representation in Parliament. But the variables of "fear of isolation" and events in Kosovo make it hard to predict the eventual impact on the DSS, the NS, G17Plus and the Democratic Party.

The other alternative is a new government led by Koštunica and formed from the current Parliament either with the support of the Radicals or actually including them. This would be preceded by Koštunica calling for a "Government of National Unity" in light of the Kosovo crisis, knowing full well that the Democratic Party, G17 Plus and the LDP would not participate.

This all brings to mind the standard television scenes of broadcasters standing out in the wind and rain on a shoreline, looking at the angry sea and waiting for the hurricane which is about to descend on them. While this "hurricane" will be entirely due to human decisions, that doesn't mean that the damage will be any less devastating.